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ARRANGING FOR OR DISPOSING OF LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA: EDWARD HINES LUMBER CO. v. VULCAN
MATERIALS CO.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") 1 was enacted to address ongoing problems resulting from hazardous substance contamination.' Congress' major concern was
the inability of existing legislation to deal with the numerous environmental
disasters, such as the Love Canal incident, which adversely affect the environment and health of the citizens of this country. 3 In order to compel those who
control hazardous substances to handle them with the utmost care, one of
CERCLA's provisions imposes direct liability on those responsible for the release of hazardous substances.4 This provision identifies four classes of responsible parties, each of whom are liable for the costs of cleaning up a contamination site.
In Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.,5 the defendant, Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc. ("Osmose"), supplied hazardous
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988)) [hereinafter
CERCLA].
2. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENT EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-10 (1980) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]
(discussing the problems caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment,
including: contamination of surface water and ground water; destruction of fish, wildlife, and vegetation; and the creation of a threat to the public health and safety); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE. HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTAINMENT ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119,
6119-20 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (discussing subcommittee's investigation of hazardous
waste disposal which found inadequate governmental protection of public health, high costs of
clean up, and various problems with dump sites); see also Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (1982) (discussing the problems associated with the four major
environmental disasters addressed in the Senate report); SUPERFUND: LITIGATION AND CLEANUP,
16 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 1 (June 28, 1985) (stating that the "protection of public health,
safety, and the environment . . . became a national priority during the 1970s").
3. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11.

4. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). The Senate report expressed a clear intent to compel
those in control of hazardous substances to prevent their release. SENATE REPORT. supra note 2, at
13-15; cf D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 25 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS] (stating that one reason for
imposing liability is to provide an incentive to prevent the occurrence of a harm).
5. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.), aff/d in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). The focus of this
Note addresses an issue discussed solely in the trial court decision. See infra notes 208-27 and
accompanying text.
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chemicals to Edward Hines Lumber Co. ("Hines"). 6 Osmose also designed
and built the facility where the chemicals were used under express warranty
that the system would prevent the escape or leakage of toxic chemicals.7 Additionally, Osmose trained the employees who operated the system.8 Further, the
company retained the right of access to the facility, to all chemicals, and to all
products to ensure that they conformed to Osmose's standard of quality.9 Finally, Osmose provided technical information and marketing assistance to
Hines. 0 Nevertheless, when the hazardous chemicals sold by Osmose were
improperly released into the environment, through the system Osmose built,
the court held that Osmose was not a responsible party under section
9607(a)(3) of CERCLA,"1 and therefore, could not be held liable for the costs
of the cleanup." This Note discusses why, in spite of strong congressional intent to ensure that those who handle hazardous substances accept responsibility for their contamination of the environment, the court found the facts involved in Edward Hines Lumber Co. were insufficient to impose liability under
CERCLA.
To resolve this issue, the Background section first explores the legislative
history and congressional intent behind CERCLA. This section also discusses
the statutory provisions that impose liability under CERCLA. The next section focuses on judicial interpretation of section 9607(a)(3), which imposes
liability on any party who arranges for the disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance. Following the discussion of the judicial interpretation of section
9607(a)(3), the Note discusses the district court's decision, in Edward Hines
Lumber Co., to grant a summary judgment motion in favor of a seller of hazardous substances. The Analysis section examines the decision in light of
both prior case law and CERCLA's legislative history. Finally, the Note addresses the impact of the decision on the requirements for liability under
CERCLA.
6. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653.
7. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.), affg in
part 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
8. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 656. Liable parties under CERCLA include:
[Alny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances . ...
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
12. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 651, 656-59 (N.D.
111.), afld in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
13. Id.
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II.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the district court's decision in Edward Hines Lumber
Co., it is useful to examine CERCLA's scope, its legislative history, and previous judicial interpretations of the "arranged for disposal" provision.
.A.

CERCLA's Legislative History

An examination of the legislative history of CERCLA reveals congressional

intent to address the dangerous problems of hazardous substance contamination and cleanup.
1.

What is a Hazardous Substance under CERCLA?
CERCLA provides a very comprehensive definition of a hazardous sub-

stance." The statutory definition encompasses hazardous substances as defined
in several other environmental statutes including: the Clean Water Act, 5 the
Clean Air Act,'" the Toxic Substances Control Act, 7 and the Solid Waste

Disposal Act.'" Additionally, section 9602 of CERCLA empowers the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to designate additional hazardous substances. 19 Pursuant to this provision, the EPA has promulgated a table of haz20
ardous substances.
2.

A Historical Perspective

In 1980, both the House of Representatives and the Senate were independently at work on a version of environmental response legislation. 2' The final
bill, however, was a compromise, hurriedly put together during the final days
of the Carter Administration. 2 This bill became the Comprehensive Environ14. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
15. Id. § 9601(14)(A), (D) (incorporating both 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A), which gives the
EPA authority to designate substances that affect the waters as "hazardous," and 33 U.S.C. §
1317(a), which regulates toxic pollutants in the water).
16. Id. § 9601(14)(E) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 7412, which sets national emissions standards
for hazardous air pollutants).
17. Id. § 9601(14)(F) (incorporating 15 U.S.C. § 2606). This Act authorizes the EPA to file a
civil action against any person who "manufactures, processes, distributes in commerce, or uses, or
disposes of, an imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture." Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(l)(B) (1988). The Act defines the term "imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture" as a "chemical substance or mixture which presents an imminent and
unreasonable risk of serious or widespread injury to health or the environment." Id. § 2606(f).
18. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C) (1988) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 6921, which authorizes the EPA to designate criteria to identify solid wastes).
19. Id. § 9602.
20. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1989).
21. See Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. 30,916-30 (1980) [hereinafter S. 1480]; Hazardous Waste Containment Act of 1980, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter H.R. 7020].
22. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that
CERCLA was an eleventh hour compromise); Grad, supra note 2, at 1-2 (commenting that the
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mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980.23 Despite strug-

gling with hazardous waste clean-up bills for more than three years, Congress
passed CERCLA without any committee reports on the bill itself.2" In its final
enactment, however, the bill contained many provisions which closely resem-

bled those of the bills from which the compromise was derived.2 5 Courts have
held that the legislative history of those earlier versions is useful to determine

26
congressional intent behind CERCLA.
The report which accompanied the precompromise Senate bill ("Senate Report") 2 7 and the report which accompanied the precompromise House bill

("House Report") 28 detailed the problems experienced by the United States as
a result of hazardous substance contamination. 29 Congress was concerned
about the recent growth of the chemical industry and the increasing danger to

society from the improper disposal of hazardous substances.

°

Perhaps of even

greater concern, however, was the .inability of existing legislation to deal with
those problems.3 " Both the House and Senate Reports pointed to numerous
environmental disasters that were handled inadequately by existing legislation. 32 Perhaps the most infamous environmental tragedy addressed by both
bill was a compromise, hurriedly put together "in the closing days of the lame duck session of an
outgoing Congress").
23. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
24. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1040 (commenting that the court was without the
benefit of committee reports to help determine the congressional intent behind CERCLA); see
also Grad, supra note 2, at I (stating that "the actual [CERCLA] bill which became law had
virtually no legislative history at all").
25. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1040 (stating that "the compromise contains many
provisions closely resembling those from earlier versions of the legislation").
26. See id. at 1040-42, 1042 n.12 (stating that although S. 1480 was a precompromise version
of the legislation, the legislative histories of those provisions that received little or no change as
part of the final compromise were useful in determining congressional intent); see Grad, supra
note 2, at 1-2 (using the legislative histories of S. 1480 and H.R. 7020 to help determine congressional intent).
27. SENATE REPORT. supra note 2.
28. HOUSE REPORT. supra note 2.
29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. SENATE REPORT. supra note 2, at 7; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17; Grad, supra note
2, at 7.
31. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-18; infra
notes 42-56 and accompanying text; see also Grad, supra note 2, at 7-8 (discussing the emphasis
the Senate placed on the inadequacy of existing legislation to deal with environmental disasters);
SUPERFUND: LITIGATION AND CLEANUP, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that CERCLA was designed
to bring order to the redundant and inadequate federal laws dealing with hazardous substance
cleanup).
32. For instance, the Senate Report contains a description of three environmental disasters that
occurred prior to the Love Canal tragedy. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-8.
The first incident was the kepone contamination of the James River in Virginia. Id. at 7. The
careless disposal practices of two kepone manufacturing companies were the cause of the releases
of the hazardous substance into the river. Id. The releases could have been controlled at a cost of
two hundred thousand dollars. Id. The uncontrolled releases, however, resulted in medical expenses and claims against the industry that were estimated to be in excess of twenty million
dollars. Id. In addition, the cost of cleaning the James River. was estimated to be eight billion
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chambers was the abandoned waste site at Love Canal.
The Love Canal disaster resulted from the uncontrolled disposal of numerous fifty-five gallon drums filled with toxic wastes. 3 3 During the 1940s, the

Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. ("Hooker Chemicals") disposed of those
wastes in an abandoned canal near Niagara Falls.34 One of those wastes,
trichlorophenol, contained dioxin, one of the world's most deadly chemicals.35
An estimated two thousand pounds of dioxin was discarded in the canal and
surrounding county.3"
In 1953, the waste in the canal was buried, and the property was sold to the
city for use as a school and playground.37 A residential community was built
in the vicinity, but little attention was given to the developing health problems
dollars. Id. Douglas Costle, the Administrator of the EPA, commented that with costs at those
levels the river would probably never be cleaned up. Id.
The Senate discussed a second disaster that resulted from the General Electric Company discharging polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), an electrical insulating fluid, into the Hudson River
over a period of many years. Commercial fishing in the river had to be stopped, and the estimated
cost to clean the river exceeded thirty million dollars. Id. at 7-8.
The third incident occurred in 1973 and involved the contamination of cattle feed by
polybrominated biphenyls ("PBBs"), a fire retardant. Id. at 8. The direct losses, including the cost
of destroyed livestock and dairy products, were estimated at one hundred million dollars. Id.
Those costs, however, did not include the health effects on the human population.. Some scientists
estimated that 90% of the Michigan population had been contaminated by PBBs through the use
of dairy products. Id.
The House Report also contains descriptions of numerous environmental disasters, including the
Love Canal incident. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-22.
33. For a general discussion of the litigation surrounding the Love Canal incident, see United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) and SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
34. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8; see Hooker Chems. & Plastics, 540 F. Supp. at 1070.
The Love Canal was originally designed in 1896 as a navigable power canal running between the

upper and lower Niagara Rivers. A.

HAY, THE CHEMICAL SCYTHE

229-30 (1982). The canal was

to be used as a source of power for industry. Id. In 1910, however, after the excavation had begun,
a method of transmitting electrical current was developed. Id. Therefore, the canal was no longer
needed as a power source, and the excavation remained untouched until about 1930 "when a new
use was found for it" as a chemical waste dump. Id.
Hooker Chemicals began dumping waste in the Canal in the 1930's and continued until 1952.
Id. During that period of time, Hooker Chemicals had dumped 21,800 tons of chemical waste into
the canal. Id. This waste included at least 200 separate chemicals, many of which were known
carcinogens. Id. at 230.
35. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 23) (stating that as little as three ounces of dioxin were enough
to kill three million people). The production of herbicides had become an extremely profitable
business. A. HAY, supra note 34, at 230. However, the manufacturing process also produced 2, 4,
5 trichlorophenol and generated dioxin. Id. Hooker Chemicals was one of the first herbicide producers. Id. Its waste from the process "was treated like any other waste, and was dumped in the
canal." Id.
36. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, U.S.A., N. Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 38).
37. See id. at 8 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 23); A. HAY, supra note 34, at 230.
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until 1978 when homes began to rapidly deteriorate. 38 It was discovered that
toxic chemicals were the cause of this deterioration. 9 When the New York
State Health Department investigated, it discovered startling health problems

including birth defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnormalities, sores, rectal
bleeding, headaches, and possible latent illnesses."' President Carter declared
4
a federal emergency, and the community had to be abandoned. 1

The Senate Report noted that existing legislation, such as the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act42 and the Clean Water Act,43 did not provide
the tools necessary to respond to and clean up disasters like Love Canal. 4 The

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was designed to control the disposal
of hazardous wastes currently being generated.'9 It failed to address aban-

doned waste sites or general releases of hazardous substances into the environment.4 Further, the Act did not provide the necessary resources to respond
immediately to releases of hazardous substances.' 7 Finally, the legislation was
limited to responding to releases of hazardous substances that could be classified as hazardous wastes. 8
The Clean Water Act established several funds to provide the resources necessary to allow immediate response to releases.4 9 In reality, however, those
38. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1979,'§ vi (Magazine), at 23); A. HAY, supra note 34, at 230.
39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times, Jan.
21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 23). Residents in the vicinity of Love Canal had complained of
"malodorous substances," but no action had been taken. A. HAY, supra note 34, at 230. However,
in the spring of 1978, unusually heavy snowfall and subsequent flooding brought the chemicals to
the surface. Id. Complaints of the terrible odors emanating from basements of houses on the edge
of the canal finally led to an investigation. Id.
Another chemical dump was found under an elementary school ball field located nearby. The
chemicals were discovered "because the ballfield swelled and contracted like a bowl of gelatin
when heavy equipment moved across it." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Brown,
Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 23).
40. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times, Jan.
21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 23). Extensive medical follow-up and testing has been performed on
current and past residents of the Love Canal. A. HAY, supra note 34, at 231-32. Although some
conclusions were reached as to the long-term health problems associated with the chemical contamination, the relatively small number of people involved makes statistical comparisons with the
general population difficult. Id.
41. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting Brown, Love Canal, USA, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 21, 1979, § vi (Magazine), at 23).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11.
45. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)-(b) (1988).
46. See id. §§ 6901-6991 (1988); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11.
47. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
48. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(a)-(b) (1988); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16 (noting
that one limitation of RCRA is that it only applies to hazardous substances that are wastes).
Liability under CERCLA was never intended to be so narrowly construed. See infra note 114 and
accompanying text.
49. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1381-1387 (1988).
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funds were either never financed or depleted." Additionally, even if a party
responsible for the release was found, the chemical contamination would continue while litigation progressed and until the necessary funds could be
collected. 5 '
The Senate Report also revealed that Congress was concerned that no federal law existed that would establish liability for releases of hazardous substances. 52 Under existing legislation, a plaintiff, whether a governmental unit
or an individual, was forced to bring suit in state court. 2 These plaintiffs were
also faced with the difficult and expensive burden of proving complex causes of
action.54 As a result, compensation was generally inadequate. 5 In addition,
the standard of liability varied from state to state, thereby encouraging those
who dealt with hazardous substances to locate in states with more lenient
laws.516
CERCLA's history demonstrates congressional intent to establish a program
of immediate response to hazardous substance contamination that could be
enforced at the federal level. 57 Congress intended "to bring order to the array
of partly redundant, partly inadequate federal hazardous substances cleanup
and compensation laws." '58
3.

The Scope of CERCLA

The Senate Report identified five areas that needed to be included in the
CERCLA legislation in order to accomplish its purposes. The legislation
needed (1) to establish a fund to finance response action; (2) to provide
sources of revenue for that fund; (3) to provide adequate authority to respond
to hazardous substance releases; (4) to provide adequate compensation to victims of such releases; and (5) to impose liability on those responsible for hazardous substance releases. 59 This section briefly examines the first four areas.
The following section elaborates on the fifth area, liability, which was at issue
50. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.

51. Id. at 10-11.
52. ld. at 11.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 16.
55. Id. at 14. A study prepared for Congress revealed that legal mechanisms in the states were
generally inadequate for redressing harms caused by releases of hazardous substances. Traditional
tort law presented barriers to recovery. Id. Further, judicial procedures to obtain compensation
were usually cumbersome, time consuming, and expensive. Id. at 13-16 (citing CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SERIAL No. 93-13, Six CASE STUDIES OF COMPOSITION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW
JERSEY AND TEXAS, (June 1980)).
56. Id.; see infra note 97 (discussing how inconsistent state laws could encourage hazardous
waste dumping in states with more lenient environmental laws).
57. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
58. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 568
(1984)); see supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
59. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13.
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in Edward Hines Lumber Co.6"

a. Superfund
An integral part of a comprehensive strategy to deal with hazardous substances is providing the resources necessary for immediate response to hazardous substance releases. In order to provide these resources, CERCLA estab-

lished what is today popularly known as "Superfund." 6 Congress authorized
the EPA6" to use Superfund resources to immediately respond to hazardous
waste sites and hazardous substance releases.63
b.

Superfund financing

The major purpose of the Superfund legislation was to provide adequate
financing to ensure that the fund's resources were never depleted, as they were
with the Clean Water Act."' Congress decided that the most equitable method
of allocating the costs of hazardous substance releases was to impose fees on

those industries which handled hazardous substances and benefitted from their
use.6" This fee structure as the method of financing the fund, as opposed to
taxation, helped ensure that those who had created the risks were not subsidized by those who had been put at risk, namely the general public. 6 In addition to the fee structure, Congress enabled the fund to recover response costs

from those parties who were held responsible for hazardous substance releases
under CERCLA.

67

60. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. 111.), aff'd in
part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
61. Hazardous Substance Superfund, 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). "Superfund" provides the resources necessary to respond immediately to, and effectuate a cleanup of, hazardous substance
releases. Prior to the existence of such a fund, response and cleanup often had to wait until the
necessary funds could be collected from a solvent perpetrator. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at
16-17. "Superfund" provides for immediate response while collection of the funds can wait until
later. Id.
62. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1988) (giving the President authority to act); Executive Order No. 12,316, §§ 2, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982) (giving the EPA the authority to act under
CERCLA); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988) (outlining authorized fund uses).
63. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that
CERCLA authorizes the federal government to respond to hazardous substance releases); United
States v. Farber, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,854, 20,855 (D.N.J. 1988) (stating that
CERCLA authorized the President to provide for governmental action, and the EPA is the agency
primarily responsible for undertaking necessary action).
64. For a discussion of the inadequacy of funds under the Clean Water Act, see supra notes 4951 and accompanying text; Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
65. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 72.
66. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-33; SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19-22.
67. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34; see, e.g.,
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 731 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (stating that one purpose of imposing liability under CERCLA
is to replenish the Superfund); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir.
1985) (stating that Superfund resources allow the EPA to respond immediately to releases of
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Federal enforcement authority
One of Congress' most urgent concerns was that the legislation provide clear

authority to act and respond to emergencies caused by releases of hazardous
substances.68 Prior legislation did not provide such authority.69 As a result,
neither the federal agencies nor the states, both of which were in a position to

help, took responsibility for cleaning hazardous substance contamination when
they were not responsible for it.70 CERCLA authorizes federal governmental
enforcement powers for both the immediate cleanup
of a release and the reme7
dial action required for permanent restoration'.

d. Compensation to victims of environmental disasters
Another purpose of CERCLA was to provide adequate compensation to vic-

tims of hazardous substance releases. 72 The economic losses borne by victims
of chemical contamination are substantial. 73 The rate of compensation to victims, however, was extremely low because existing legislation did not establish
federal liability for releases, and recovery under state laws was uncertain and

often difficult. 7 Although Congress would have preferred to compensate all
injured parties with CERCLA resources, it recognized the need to balance
hazardous substances and then later the "EPA can sue for reimbursement of cleanup costs from
any responsible party it can locate"). For a discussion of CERCLA's making those parties responsible for hazardous substance releases bear the costs of their actions, see also infra notes 78-88
and accompanying text.
68, SENATE REPORT. supra note 2, at 22 (stating that CERCLA must clearly establish the
agency responsible for responding to releases of hazardous substances and the scope of that
agency's authority); see supra notes 62-63.
69. Prior legislation did not adequately specify who was to take responsibility for responding to
and cleaning up releases of hazardous substances. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. Legislation that did provide authority was usually too narrow to adequately respond. For example, the
Clean Water Act only gave authority to respond to chemical spills in navigable water; it did not
give authority to respond to most groundwater contamination. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(1988); see SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
70. SENATE REPORT. supra note 2, at 22. During his testimony before a joint subcommittee, the
President of the Love Canal Home Owners Association stated: "Neither the state nor the federal
agencies who could help were responsible for the situation (Love Canal). And neither wanted to
take financial responsibility for clearing it up." Id.
71. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988); Grad, supra note 2, at 11; see, e.g., New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that CERCLA authorizes the
federal government to respond); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(stating that Congress intended to provide the federal government with prompt and effective response authority through CERCLA); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986)
(finding it an important legislative purpose "to give the federal government the tools necessary for
a prompt and effective response to hazardous waste problems"); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (finding that both the House and Senate
committee reports expressed the need for prompt action and, therefore, intended to provide the
federal government with the tools necessary for prompt and effective response).
72. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-24.
73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 16, 23.
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compensation against the fiscal restraints of the fund.7 In the end, Congress
restricted Superfund compensation to the victim's medical expenses and a lim7
ited amount of lost wages. 1
e.

Responsible parties

The fifth area that Congress considered necessary in order to achieve a comprehensive strategy was the imposition of liability on parties responsible for
hazardous substance releases. CERCLA created four classes of persons subject to liability for the release of a hazardous substance. 77 The next section
identifies each of these classes, focusing on the two classes at issue in Edward
Hines Lumber.
B.

Liability as a Responsible Party under CERCLA

This section explains the scope of liability under CERCLA. First, this section discusses persons liable under CERCLA. Second, this section describes
how the courts have determined that persons should be held strictly liable,
despite the absence of any express standard of liability in the language of
CERCLA. Finally, this section considers the CERCLA provision which expressly authorizes a responsible party to seek contribution from another liable,
or potentially liable, party.
1.

Who is a Responsible Party?

CERCLA was intended to provide an incentive to "all involved with hazardous substances to assure that such substances are handled with the utmost of
'
care."78
As such, the standard of liability was intended to encourage those who
transact in hazardous substances to handle those substances with care, rather
than simply rely on the government to abate the hazards.79 In order to accomplish this objective, section 9607(a) of CERCLA imposes liability on four classes of individuals: (1) current owners or operators of a facility at which hazardous substances are released; (2) persons who owned or operated the facility
at the time hazardous substances were disposed of at the facility; (3) a person
75. Id. at 23 (stating that "fiscal problems ... would result if a fee-based fund were required
to compensate for all damages due those who have been or might become victims of such losses").
76. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988); see also Grad, supra note 2, at 13 (discussing the
compensation features of the proposed bill, S. 1480).
77. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
78. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31; see also infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text
(discussing liability creating a compelling incentive). Although the Senate Report provides only a
precompromise version of the legislative history, courts have found it quite useful in determining
congressional intent behind CERCLA. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. The Senate
Report's version of CERCLA imposed liability on substantially the same four classes of individuals as the final CERCLA legislation. See infra note 81. The Senate Report, therefore, should be
useful in determining congressional intent. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
79. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (stating that this standard is designed to encourage the voluntary mitigation of damages).
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who arranged for the disposal or treatment of the hazardous substance;"0 and
(4) transporters of hazardous substances to disposal or treatment facilities.81
2.

Standard of Liability

In order to force those responsible for hazardous substance releases to bear
the costs of their activities, Congress imposed broad liability under CERCLA.8 2 The Senate Report reflected the position that liability should be
80. Hines Lumber sued to impose liability under the second and third classes alleging that
Osmose was an "owner or operator" and had "arranged for the disposal and treatment" of a
hazardous substance. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 65456 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text (discussing the classes of responsible parties involved in Edward Hines Lumber Co.).
81. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The final CERCLA legislation imposed liability on
four classes of persons:
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities or sites, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable ....
Id.

This final version of the legislation closely resembles the Senate version before the compromise.
See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Therefore, reference to the SENATE REPORT, supra

note 2, is helpful when interpreting the reach of liability under CERCLA. See supra notes 25-26
and accompanying text. The proposed Senate version, S. 1480, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, imposed liability upon:
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility or site at which such hazardous substances are disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport for disposal or treatment by any other party or entity of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, at facilities or sites owned or operated
by such other party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities or sites selected by such person,
from which a hazardous substance is discharged. released, or disposed of or from
which any pollutant or contaminant is released resulting in action under section
3(c)(1) of the Act, shall be jointly, severally, and strictly liable for all removal costs
and specified damages.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp, 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (deciding that
Congress intended to provide the federal government with a prompt and effective response mechanism and force those responsible for a release to bear the costs of their action (citing Violet v.
Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.RI. 1986)); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.Minn. 1982) (finding that Congress intended that those responsible for
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strict8" and joint and several.84 This liability standard ensures that those who

financially benefit from handling inherently hazardous materials "internalize
the health and environmental costs of that activity into the costs of doing business." 85 Strict and joint and several liability eases a plaintiff's burden in recovering damages." In addition, this liability also "create[s] a compelling incentive for those in control of hazardous substances to prevent releases and thus
protect the public from harm."8 Parties who create hazardous substances
know more about their inherent risks and how to avoid those risks.88 The incentive, therefore, should be directed at those parties.
Despite the strong policy considerations expressed in the Senate Report,

CERCLA does not expressly provide for strict and joint and several liability.8 9
The statute's definitional section provides that the standard of liability under
CERCLA is the same as the standard of liability under the Clean Water
Act."0 The Clean Water Act also does not expressly define a standard of liabilhazardous substance problems should bear the costs of remedying the problems they created); see
supra note 2, at 13; Comment, "Arrangingfor Disposal" Under CERCLA:
When is a GeneratorLiable?, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,160 (June 1985); cf PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 4, at 536 (providing that under strict liability, social policy may
dictate that abnormally dangerous activities be tolerated by the law, but a defendant who engages
SENATE REPORT,

in those activities must bear the resulting costs).

83. "Strict Liability" is "liability that is imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to
interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for doing so, or (2) a breach
of duty to exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence." PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS,
supra note 4, at 534.
84. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. The term "joint and several liability" "[d]escribes the
liability of comprisors of the same performance when each of them, individually, has the duty of

fully performing the obligation, and the obligee can sue all or any of them upon breach of performance." BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 837 (6th ed. 1990).
85. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13; see also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 4,
at 537 (stating that a defendant, who seeks to profit by engaging in hazardous activities, is in the
best position to administer the risk involved in his activities by incorporating the costs of the risk
into the cost of doing business).
86. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-15. This report reflects congressional concern that
without strict and joint and several liability, a plaintiff would have to identify all responsible
parties and then prove what portion of the damages was attributable to each defendant. Id. Strict
and joint and several liability, however, allows the plaintiff to recover in full from any responsible
party. Id. Further, the burden is then placed on that responsible party to receive contribution from
other responsible parties. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 15.
89. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988); see also New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the legislative compromise did not include
a provision requiring strict and joint and several liability); United States v. Conservation Chem.

Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 204, 223 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (stating that both the terms 'strict' and 'joint
and several' were deleted from a prior draft of CERCLA legislation); S. COOKE, THE LAW OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE, § 14.01[6][b], [c], at 93-95 (1987) (stating that "the statute does not expressly define the standard of liability").

90. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988); see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0
(1988). The Clean Water Act states:
Except where an owner or operator can prove that a discharge was caused solely by
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ity.9 ' Federal courts, however, have consistently interpreted the Clean Water
Act to impose strict liability,92 and courts have similarly held that CERCLA
imposes strict liability.9"
Federal courts have also concluded that Congress did not intend to preclude

joint and several liability under CERCLA. 94 Although all reference to the
joint and several standard was deleted from the final legislation, Congress intended to make that standard permissible rather than mandatory.95 Joint and
several liability may be imposed unless it would be inequitable to do so and

liability could be apportioned among tortfeasors. 9" In deciding whether the
(A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part of the United States
government, or (D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether any
such act or omission was or was not negligent, or any combination of the foregoing
clauses, such owner or operator of any vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance
is discharged in violation of subsection(b)(3) of this section shall, notwithstanding any
other provision of law, be liable to the United States Government ....
Id.
91. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
92. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979)
(holding that the appropriate standard of liability under the Clean Water Act is strict liability);
see also S. COOKE, supra note 89, § 14.0116][b], at 94 (discussing that courts have consistently
held that the liability standard under the Clean Water Act is strict liability).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with
the overwhelming body of precedent that has interpreted § 9607(a) as establishing strict liability);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that CERCLA imposes strict liability because liability under the Clean Water Act is
strict and that standard applies to CERCLA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that CERCLA imposes strict
liability); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (D.C. Mo. 1985)
(same); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 897 (D.C.N.C. 1985) (same); United States v.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that CERCLA applies the
same strict liability standard as the Clean Water Act). For a general discussion of strict liability
under CERCLA, see S. COOKE, supra note 89, § 14.01[6][b], at 93-95.
94. For a statutory list of liable parties under CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
95. E.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that
CERCLA "permits, but does not require, the imposition of joint and several liability"); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983); see also S. COOKE, supra
note 89, § 14.01[6][b], at 95-100 (discussing the imposition of joint and several liability under
CERCLA).
The Chem-Dyne court found:
A reading of the entire legislative history in context reveals that the scope of liability
and term joint and several liability were deleted to avoid a mandatory legislative standard applicable in all situations which might produce inequitable results in some
cases. The deletion was not intended as a rejection of joint and several liability.
Rather, the term was omitted in order to have the scope of liability determined under
common law principles, where a court performing a case by case evaluation of the
complex factual scenarios associated with multiple-generator waste sites will assess
the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an individual basis.
Chem-Dyne. 572 F. Supp. at 808 (citations omitted). The court then ruled that joint and several
liability was not precluded under CERCLA. Id.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 731
(8th Cir. 1986) (finding that responsible parties can be held jointly and severally liable under
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joint and several liability standard should be applied, Congress intended that
97
federal courts further develop a uniform federal common law.
Although Congress intended CERCLA's liability provisions to create incentives for those who controlled hazardous substances to handle those substances

with care, it is not clear from the statute just how far Congress intended to
extend liability." As such, the judicial system has been forced to determine
CERCLA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 n.13 (2nd Cir. 1985) (stating that "joint and several liability standards should be addressed
by the courts and interpreted in light of the common law"); United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (stating that CERCLA imposes joint and several
liability on a case by case basis) (citing both United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 808
(S.D. Ohio 1983), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433A (1965)). The Restatement
provides that a tortfeasor is responsible for the entire harm broughi about by his conduct unless
the harm can be apportioned among joint tortfeasors where "there are distinct harms, or there is a
reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 433A (1965).

97. E.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223-25 (D.C. Mo. 1985);
Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D.C. Colo. 1985); United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983). In Wade, the court found that Congress intended
courts to use common law as a guide when deciding whether joint and several liability should
apply. Id. at 1332. The court, however, had to decide whether to apply state common law or
federal common law. Id. The court found not only that state laws were ineffective in dealing with
hazardous 'substances but also that state common law regarding joint and several liability was not
consistent between states. Id. The court reasoned that using state common law could encourage
illegal dumping in states with more lenient environmental laws. Id. The court, relying on Texas
Indus. Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981), ruled that federal courts
could create federal common law when necessary to protect uniquely federal interests. Wade, 577
F. Supp. at 1338. Noting the strong federal interest in controlling the disposal of toxic wastes, the
inability of state law to address this problem, and the need to establish a uniform liability standard, the court concluded that Congress intended that courts develop a federal common law to
resolve liability issues under CERCLA. Id. at 1337-38.
Despite a strong presumption against federal courts fashioning common law to decide cases,

"[flederal common law always has existed and always will exist." E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 296 (1989). "Federal common law has developed out of [the] necessity" to
develop legal rules to apply statutory and constitutional provisions, to decide disputes between
states, to fulfill congressional intent, and to prevent state law from frustrating federal interests. Id.
at 295-96.
The development of federal common law has been criticized on federalism and separation of
powers grounds. Id. at 296. However, neither of these issues has prevented federal common law
from continuing to develop. Id. at 297. Although the federal common law can displace state laws
and generate objections to such a taking of power, failure to fashion federal common law could
allow state law to frustrate federal interests and therefore offend federalism. Id. at 296. In addition, federal common law is often developed in order to fulfill congressional intent, which undermines any separation of powers objection. Id. at 295.
98. Courts struggled to find the appropriate scope of liability under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a) (1988), and had special difficulties defining the scope of liability under § 9607(a)(3),
which imposes liability on persons who arrange for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances. E.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-82 (8th Cir.
1989) (denying a motion to dismiss a suit for the release of hazardous substances by a pesticide
manufacturer under the "arranged for disposal" provision because "in some circumstances . . . an
arrangement based on acquiescence to certain effects can be considered an arrangement for such
effects"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th
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the scope of liability under CERCLA. °9
3. Contribution Among Liable or Potentially Liable Parties
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986100 added a
provision to CERCLA.' 0' This provision, section 9613(f), enables a responsible
party held liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially
liable parties for response costs properly allocated to those parties."0 2 Congress
expressed two purposes behind the contribution provision. One purpose was to
expedite management of litigation by allowing the government to sue only a
few of the major responsible parties."0 3 Those parties, held jointly and severally liable, could then sue to recover from other responsible parties. 04 The
second purpose was to make responsible parties more willing to assume financial responsibility for the cleanup by allowing them to seek contribution from
others."0 5 As one court stated, "When two or more persons share responsibility
for a common injury, 'it is inequitable to require one to pay the entire cost of
reparation, and it is sound policy to deter all wrongdoers by reducing the likelihood that any will entirely escape liability.' "16
In order to establish a right of contribution, the party seeking contribution
must prove that the party from whom contribution is sought is also liable
Cir. 1986) (holding corporate employee personally liable under the "arranged for disposal" provision because the individual had authority to control and was responsible for the disposal of the
plant's hazardous substances).
99. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th
Cir.) (finding that laws like CERCLA have not only objectives, but also limits, and it is the
court's job to find the stopping points), affg in part 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. I11. 1988); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (stating that the scope
of liability under CERCLA is to be determined by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis).
100. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1647.
101. Id. (creating 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)).
102. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988). "The principal of 'contribution' is that a
tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered is entitled to recover proportional shares of the
judgment from other joint tortfeasors whose conduct contributed to the injury and who were also
liable to the plaintiff." United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 224 (D.C.
Mo. 1985).
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any person who is liable or potentially liable
under section [9607(a) of this title], during or following any civil action under section
[9606 of this title] or under section [9607(a) of this title]. . . . In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.
Id.
103. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, SUPERFUND IMPROVEMENT ACT
oF 1985, S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 [hereinafter SARA REPORT].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 224 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 88 (1981)).
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under CERCLA. 1°7 In resolving contribution claims, courts are expected to
allocate costs among the parties using those equitable factors that the court
determines are appropriate.10 8
C. Judicial Interpretationof Section 9607(a)(3)
Section 9607(a)(3) imposes liability on "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment . ..of hazardous sub-

stances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances."109 The plain language makes it clear that persons who
arrange for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances will be held
liable under CERCLA. 1 ' Courts, however, have often found it difficult to determine whether a person has arranged for disposal. CERCLA does not define
the term "arranged for,""' but it does provide very broad definitions for the
terms "disposal," "treatment,"' 1 2 and "hazardous substance."'" Not surpris107. See, e.g., United States v. Farber, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,854, 20,855
(D.N.J. 1988) (stating that the party from whom contribution is sought must fall within one of
the four classes of persons held liable under § 9607 of CERCLA); see also supra note 102 (discussing contribution).
108. See, e.g., Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 225 (holding that courts are expected
to do what is fair and equitable when resolving contribution claims).
109. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding that those who arrange for the disposal of released hazardous substances are liable
persons under CERCLA (citing Conservation Chem. Co. 619 F. Supp. at 184)); United States v.
A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (finding that the language which
imposes liability on those who arrange for disposal is broad); see also S. COOKE, supra note 89, §
14.01 [5][d] [ii], at 76 (stating that the language of the statute "makes it quite clear" that those
who arrange for disposal of a hazardous substance at a facility from which a release occurs may
be held liable). For the text of § 9607(a), see supra note 81.
111. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988); see also Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at
1379 (finding that CERCLA did not define "arranged for").
112. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988) (providing that the terms "disposal" and "treatment" shall have the same meaning provided in § 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6903 (1988)).
The Solid Waste Disposal Act provides:
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so
that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the
environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including
ground waters.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(34) (1988).
The term "treatment" means any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition
of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste
nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for storage, or
reduced in volume.
Id. § 6903(3); see also S. COOKE, supra note 89, § 14.01[5][d][ii], at 14-77 (reasoning that the
broad definitions of "disposal" and "treatment" have led courts to apply the term "arranging for
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ingly, courts have also broadly construed the term "arranged for disposal."
The courts have held that CERCLA statutory language should be broadly
construed in order to avoid frustrating the beneficial legislative purposes of
protecting and preserving the public health. 14 Given that congressional intent
behind CERCLA was to make all involved with hazardous substances share in
disposal" far beyond the typical situation where a person hires someone to dispose of his hazardous waste).
113. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). A hazardous substance is defined under CERCLA as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section [1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act],
(B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section [9602 of CERCLA],
(C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant
to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 69211 (but not including
any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of Congress),
(D) any toxic pollutant listed under section [1317(a) of Title 33],
(E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42
U.S.C. section 7412], and
(F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which
the Administrator has taken action pursuant to [section 2606 of Title 15, the Toxic
Substances Control Act] ....
Id. (citations omitted).
114. E.g., Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1380 (finding that liberal judicial interpretation of the term "arranged for disposal" is consistent with CERCLA's "overwhelmingly remedial"
statutory purpose); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir. 1986) (holding that the court was obligated to construe CERCLA provisions liberally in
order to avoid frustrating the beneficial congressional objective of protecting and preserving the
public health and the environment (citing United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902
(D.N.H. 1985)); United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1265, 126768 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) (courts have consistently given CERCLA's language expansive construction in order to achieve the congressional objectives); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298,
1306-07 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that § 9607(a) of CERCLA was to be accorded broad interpretation); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986) (stating that Congress intended broad judicial interpretation of CERCLA in order to accomplish congressional objectives);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (referring to
3A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.02 (4th ed.
1986), the court stated, "'statutes which are enacted for the protection and preservation of public
health' are to be given 'an extremely liberal construction for the accomplishment and maximization of their beneficent objectives' "); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 302
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting defendant's restrictive reading of CERCLA's liability provisions
which would have frustrated the legislative purpose); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (stating that in order to give effect to congressional
concerns, CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction); see also New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to interpret § 9607(a) in any
way that frustrates the statute's goals); United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 582 F. Supp.
842, 845 (S.D. 11. 1984) (holding that the broad language of § 9607(a)(3) imposes liability on a
broad range of persons). But see Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 18 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,998, 20,999 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that liability under CERCLA
should be narrowly construed).
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the costs of their activities,"' liability could extend to any and all persons who
had any relationship with the hazardous substances. Theoretically, any person
who has been involved with hazardous substances is a contributing cause if a
release of those substances occurs. Courts, however, have never construed "arranged for disposal" this broadly.
One way courts limited the extent of liability under section 9607(a)(3) is by
holding that the sale of a hazardous substance, as a useful product or a useful
raw material, does not by itself constitute arranging for the disposal of a hazardous substance." 6 In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 7 the
seller of a useful hazardous substance was relieved of any liability under CERCLA's "arranged for disposal" provision.18 Monsanto manufactured and sold
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") to Westinghouse, which utilized them as
a dielectric fluid in the electrical equipment that it manufactured.' Westinghouse then disposed of the 2 0waste from its manufacturing process, which included PCBs, at a landfill.'
The United States brought suit against Westinghouse, claiming that Westinghouse had disposed of the PCBs.121 Westinghouse sought to bring Monsanto into the suit as a third party defendant, claiming that because Monsanto
had manufactured and sold the PCBs it also was responsible for the release of
the PCBs.' The court rejected this argument and held that Monsanto had
not arranged for the disposal of PCBs but had merely sold a useful raw material to Westinghouse for use as one of its products. 2 Westinghouse was the
party that generated waste and arranged for its disposal. 21 Monsanto retained
no control over the disposal process. 25 Therefore, according to the court, Monsanto was not liable to Westinghouse under CERCLA.'2 6
A similar result was reached in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,1 2 7 where the court held that the seller of a useful product containing a hazardous substance was not liable for arranging for its disposal.' 28 Allis-Chalmers sold Florida Power electrical transformers, a completed useful
product that contained mineral oil in accordance with their design. 29 The
115. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
116. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind.
1983).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1233.
119. Id. at 1232.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1231-33.
122. Id. at 1232.
123. Id. at 1233; see S. CoOKE, supra note 89, § 14.01[5][d], at 14-78.
124. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230, 1233 (S.D.
Ind. 1983).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,998 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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mineral oil contained PCBs. 1 ° After many years of use, Florida Power disposed of the transformers, and the PCBs leaked into the environment.' 3 1 Florida Power was held liable under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA for arranging
for the disposal of the transformers.132 Florida Power attempted to recover
contribution from Allis-Chalmers, claiming that Allis-Chalmers should have
foreseen that it would eventually need to dispose of the product.' The court
rejected Florida Power's claim and held that the sale of a hazardous substance
does not, in itself, constitute arranging for disposal under CERCLA. 34 The
fact that Allis-Chalmers might have foreseen the eventual need to dispose of
the transformers was not sufficient to impose liability. 3 5 Only the party who
determined the method of disposal could be liable.' Allis-Chalmers merely
sold a useful product to Florida Power.' 37 Florida Power, however, decided
how the substance would be disposed of and who would dispose of it. 138
Although the sale of a useful product containing hazardous substances is
not, by itself, sufficient to impose liability under CERCLA, the seller may be
held liable if the sale was motivated by a need to dispose of the substance.' 3 9
In United States v. A & F Materials Co.,14 0 the defendant, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, sold its spent caustic solution to A & F Materials Co. ("A &
F"), an oil reclamation facility. 4' A & F used the solution at its facility to
neutralize acidic oil.' 4 2 The solution, however, was released into the environment from A & F's facility.' 43 McDonnell Douglas claimed that it was not
subject to liability under CERCLA because the sale of a useful product did
not constitute arranging for the product's disposal.' 4 The court, ruling that
the important question was who decided to place the waste at the disposal site,
disagreed and denied defendant's motion for summary judgment."' McDonnell Douglas needed to dispose of the spent caustic solution.' They chose to
do so, however, by selling it to A & F, a facility at which the waste was used
and disposed. 47 The sale of the substance to A & F did not absolve McDonnell Douglas from liability because McDonnell Douglas itself decided to place
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20,999.
Id. at 20,998.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. I11.1984).
Id.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 844-45.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 844-845.
Id. at 844.
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148
its waste at the disposal site.

The District Court for the Northern District of New York circumvented
prior case law that provided an exemption from liability where there had been
a sale of a useful product. In New York v. General Electric Co.,'49 the court,

in denying a motion to dismiss, ruled that liability may be imposed where a
seller knew, or had imputed knowledge of, the intended use of the hazardous
substance and where that use constituted disposal under CERCLA. 150
In General Electric, the defendant sold used transformer oil, containing

PCBs, to a dragstrip.' 51 This dragstrip used the oil to suppress dust by spraying it directly on the ground." 2 The court held that the dragstrip's use of the
oil constituted disposal under CERCLA, and, therefore, the defendant, General Electric, was "not entitled to avoid liability.' ' 153 General Electric had
knowledge, or imputed knowledge, that the dragstrip would place the oil on
the ground.' 54 The court, therefore, held that General Electric may have ar-

ranged for disposal.' 55
Two recent cases have extended this knowledge theory further by holding

that parties who transfer hazardous substances for a use that would leak, spill,
or otherwise dispose of the hazardous substances may be liable under CERCLA.' 5 These courts denied motions to dismiss claims of liability under
9607(a)(3) despite the fact that the transfers themselves did not constitute

disposal of a hazardous substance. 57 United States v. Aceto Agricultural
Chemicals Corp.' and United States v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.'59 both involved pesticide manufacturers who delivered chemicals to a processor. 60 The

processor then "formulated"''

the chemicals into pesticides suitable for sale

148. Id. at 845; see also New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that defendant who intended to dispose of its hazardous waste could not contract
away its liabilities by classifying its arrangements as sales).
149. 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 293.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 297.
154. Id.
155. Id. The General Electric court held that the defendant could be held liable for arranging
for disposal under two separate theories. The first theory was that General Electric was motivated
to sell its used transformer oil by a need to dispose of it and, under those circumstances, would
have arranged for disposal of its waste. Id. The second theory was that General Electric knew or
should have known that the buyer was going to place the oil onto the ground. Id. This use of the
oil constituted disposal, and therefore General Electric could be held liable for arranging for disposal. Id. General Electric's motion to dismiss was denied because this presented a question to be
decided by a jury. Id.
156. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
157. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1382; Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. at 143.

158. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
159. 701 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
160. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1375; Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. at 142.

161. In Aceto, the court described the process as one in which "[f]ormulators mix the manufac-

19911

EDWARD HINES LUMBER

and distribution and transferred them back to the manufacturer.1 62 Leakage
and spillage of these chemicals was an inherent part of the formulation process. 63 Each court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss a claim of liability for arranging for the disposal of a hazardous substance.1'4 The courts reasoned that as a result of the industry-wide practices in formulating pesticides,
the defendants should have known that chemicals would leak and spill.' 65 The
district court in Aceto stated that "an arrangement based on acquiescence to
66
certain inevitable effects can be considered arrangement for those effects."'
In each case, the defendants' arrangement with the formulator, and acquies-

cence to the spills and leaks of formulation, was considered an arrangement
67
for disposal.
In Aceto, the court also based its denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on
the argument that the defendants retained authority to control the disposal of
the hazardous substances. 68 Since the defendants merely transferred the
chemicals and did not sell them, the defendant retained authority to control
the chemicals because it retained ownership throughout the formulation process. 6' The court, however, found that such continued ownership is not a prerequisite to extending liability under CERCLA.170 Liability under the arranged for disposal provision required only a finding that the defendant

7
retained some authority to control the disposal of the hazardous substances.' '

Continued ownership, however, lends support to the court's finding that the
defendant retained some authority to control the disposal of hazardous
72
substances.
turer's active ingredients with inert materials using the specifications provided by the manufacturer. The resulting commercial grade product is then packaged by the formulator and then
shipped back to the manufacturer or shipped directly to customers of the manufacturer." Aceto
Agric. Chems Corp., 872 F.2d at 1375.
162. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 140, 141 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
163. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1379; Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. at 142.
164. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1382; Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. at 143.
165. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1381-82 ("waste is generated and disposed of
contemporaneously with the process"); Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. at 142. The complaining party in Velsicol Chem. Corp. argued that defendant "knew that there would be losses of
pesticide through spills or leaks and that wastes could be generated through the formulation process." Id. The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, ruling that "plaintiff's complaint contain[ed] allegations that [defendants] arranged . . . for disposal of hazardous substances." Id.
166. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D. Iowa 1988),
af/rd in part and rev'd in part, 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
167. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 140, 143 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
168. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1381-82.
169. Id. at 1381.
170. Id.at 1382.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 n.2
(S.D. Iowa 1988) (stating that "the only ownership which is necessary is ownership at the time of
the arrangement, which is seldom in dispute") (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceuti-
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In summary, courts have consistently refused to find that the mere sale of a
useful hazardous substance constitutes an arrangement for disposal under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA. There are, however, three instances where a
seller of a hazardous substance may be found liable for arranging for disposal:
(1) where at least part of the motivation to sell was to dispose of the substance;17 (2) where the seller should have known the intended use of the substance, and that intended use constituted disposal; 174 or (3) where the seller
retained authority to control the disposal process.1 75 Recently, the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois narrowed the scope of prior case law
in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.' 76 The court refused to

impose CERCLA liability on a seller of hazardous substances because it
lacked any motivation to dispose of hazardous substances.
III.

EDWARD HINES LUMBER CO. V. VULCAN MATERIALS CO.

A.

Facts

The Hines Lumber Co. ("Hines") owned and operated a wood treatment
facility in Mena, Arkansas. 77 It entered into an extensive agreement with Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of America, Inc. ("Osmose"), an experienced supplier of chromated copper arsenate ("CCA"),' 78 to build a closed looped wood

treatment system at the Hines facility.

79

Pursuant to this agreement, Osmose

cal & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987)), affid in
part and rev'd in part, Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). The court in
Northeastern Pharmaceuticalstated that it is not consistent with the broad remedial purposes of
CERCLA to require proof of ownership or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a
prerequisite for liability under § 9607(a)(3). United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 189 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (stating that a corporate officer who had the authority to control the operation of the facility could be classified as an
operator of the facility notwithstanding his position as a corporate employee).
173. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text. The wording of this theory of liability is
important. The cases which support this theory do not require the seller to be aware that the use
specifically constituted disposal under CERCLA. The seller need only have knowledge, or imputed
knowledge, of the intended use and that use is found to constitute disposal under CERCLA. Id.
For example, in New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984), the court
found that the seller may be liable because (1) seller should have known that the hazardous
substance was being used as a spray on the ground, id. at 297, and (2) the spray constituted
disposal under CERCLA. Id. at 293. The court only required knowledge of the intended use and
did not require knowledge that the use constituted disposal under CERCLA. See id.
175. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
176. 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill.), affid in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
177. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
178. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653. The district court assumed CCA is a
hazardous substance under CERCLA. Id. at 656.
179. Id. The Appellant's Brief stated that "Osmose represented that no waste would result
from the Osmose plant or the Osmose process, since the plant was designed to and would comply
with all local, state and.federal laws, rules and regulations." Brief for Appellant at 10, Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988) (No. 88-1403).
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599

agreed to advise and consult Hines on the selection of an appropriate location
for the CCA treatment system."'8 Further, Osmose agreed to design, build,
and install a system which would not allow any toxic chemicals to escape. 18'
Osmose also agreed to train Hines' employees to operate the system.'8 2 Fimarketing assisnally, Osmose agreed to provide technical information and
183
trademark.
Osmose's
use
to
Hines
authorize
to
and
tance
Hines' role in this agreement was to exercise sole responsibility for the operation, maintenance, upkeep, and control of the facility."' It was also responsible for keeping the products in compliance with local, state, and federal regulations. 8 5 Additionally, Hines agreed to purchase ail of its CCA from Osmose
for a period of five years.' a6
The agreement provided that Osmose retained the right to full and immediate access to the facility. 7 Osmose also retained authority over all chemical
processes and products to ensure that they conformed to Osmose's standard of
quality control.' 88 Although Osmose retained this control, none of Osmose's
employees were present at the facility on a regular basis."' Hines operated the
facility until 1978, during which time it stored the discharge from the wood
treatment process in a holding pond at the site. 90 In 1978, Hines sold the
facility to Mid-South Wood Products, Inc. ("Mid-South"), which continued to
operate the facility.'
In 1982, the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology found
that CCA, among other chemicals,' had contaminated the ground water near
the plant.' In 1985, testing conducted by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency confirmed that the Hines facility was the source of such
contamination."' Hines and Mid-South signed a consent decree promising to
clean up the site.' By the time the litigation began, these companies had
nearly completed the work, which cost approximately five million dollars.' 96
180. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.

186. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.), afig in
part 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
187. Id.
188. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Il1.),
affid in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 652.
191. Id.
192. The EPA found that the holding pond also contained creosote and pentachlorophenol. Id.
at 653.
193. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 155 (7th Cir.), aJfg in
part 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
194. Id. at 157.
195. Id. at 155.
196. Id. The EPA attributed the CCA contamination to problems with the design of both the
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Initially, Hines filed suit against Vulcan Materials Co. ("Vulcan"), a supplier of a wood preserving chemical, pentachlorophenol, in order to seek contribution under section 9613(f) for past and future costs resulting from the
contamination.

9

Hines subsequently added other defendants as both third-

party and direct defendants. 198 Most of these defendants, including Vulcan,
however, were eventually dismissed from the suit because they merely supplied
chemicals to Hines. 19" The dismissed defendants did not maintain any control
over those chemicals or possess knowledge that the facility might improperly
200
dispose of them.
Osmose's relationship with Hines, on the other hand, went much further
than merely selling supplies.2 0 1 Hines, therefore, pursued its claim against Os-

mose.20 2 Hines alleged that Osmose designed the system defectively and failed

to meet quality control standards, 01 that Osmose improperly trained Hines'
employees,2 0 ' and that Osmose failed to disclose any of these defects to Hines,

which prevented Hines from rectifying the problem. 20 5 Hines argued that Osmose was liable as a responsible party under CERCLA because it arranged
for the disposal of a hazardous substance within the meaning of section
20 7
9607(a)(3). 2 0 Osmose moved for summary judgment.

B.

Procedure

The procedural history of the Edward Hines Lumber Co. litigation is some-

what confusing. Hines Lumber Co., a responsible party under CERCLA, sued
Osmose seeking contribution for costs incurred by Hines in cleaning up a conHines plant and the concrete pads underneath it. The EPA required "excavation of the contaminated soils adjacent to the CCA plant, placement of these soils in an on-site landfill and remedial
action at the CCA plant to abate and prevent the on-going contaminated runoff." Brief for Appellant at 13, Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 155 (7th Cir. 1988)
(No. 88-1403).
197. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 652-53 (N.D. I11.),
affd in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
198. Id. at 653.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 669 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Il1.
1987) (dismissing all state law claims against all defendants); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., No. 27368 (N.D. I11.Dec. 4, 1987) (WESTLAW, State library, I11.courts file)
(ordering dismissal of two defendants with prejudice).
201. See Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653.

202. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.), affg in
part 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Although the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Osmose and a group of defendants who had supplied creosote to Hines, see Edward Hines
Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653, this Note solely focuses on Osmose's potential liability due to
the nature of its relationship with Hines.
203. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 653.

204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 652.
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tamination site." 8 Hines alleged liability under two of CERCLA's four classes
of responsible parties: (1) that Osmose had been an "owner or operator" of
Hines' facility,20 9 and (2) that Osmose had arranged for disposal of the haz210
ardous substances.
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois did not find Osmose
liable under either the "owner or operator" provision or the "arranged for disposal" provision." Hines appealed the district court's decision, but only raised
212
the issue of whether Osmose was an "owner or operator" of Hines' facility.
In an uncontroversial decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision on the "owner or operator" issue. 21 3
The focus of this Note is on the district court's decision with respect to the
"arranged for disposal" question. This Note contends that had Hines Lumber
appealed the district court's decision on the "arranged for disposal". question,
the grant of summary judgment should have been reversed.
C.

The District Court Decision

The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted Osmose's
motion for summary judgment on both issues.21 4 The court held that there
were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Osmose had arranged

208. Id.
209. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). This Note does not focus on the "owner or
operator" issue because the district court's finding on this issue was not controversial. See Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656-57 (N.D. Ill.), affd in part.
861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). The court stated: "The extent of Osmose's involvement went no
further than building the treatment system and training personnel in its operation." Id. at 657; see
also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 742-43 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding defendants not liable as "owners and operators" because they "did not own or
operate" the actual disposal "facility"); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
162, 186-90 (D.C. Mo. 1985) (holding that both a corporate owner and operator and "corporate
officers who actively participate in the management of a disposal facility can be held . . . liable
under" § 9607(a)).
210. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988); supra note 81 (providing the full text of §
9607(a)).
211. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 656-57.
212. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 155 (7th Cir.),
affg in part 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
213. Id. at 158-59. The appellate court's decision, which was confined to the "owner or operator" provision, is not controversial because it is consistent with prior precedent on this issue. See
supra note 209.
214. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656-57 (N.D. Ill.),
afld in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988). Hines had also argued, at the district court level, that
if Osmose was not a responsible party under CERCLA, it was still liable for contribution under
state law. Id. at 657-59. The court held that CERCLA did not preempt state law, and therefore, a
state law action seeking contribution for costs incurred in cleaning a hazardous waste site was
permissible. Id. at 658. The court further held, however, that Hines was unable to prosecute the
state law claim because Arkansas law governed the case. Id. Even though a state law action was
available, Hines did not satisfy the requirements of the Arkansas contribution act. Id.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
for the disposal of the hazardous substances.
21 6
to summary judgment.
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Osmose was, therefore, entitled

In responding to Osmose's motion for summary judgment, Hines argued
that section 9607(a)(3) imposed liability on all chemical manufacturers who
sold a hazardous substance to a party who used the substance in its manufacturing or commercial process and then disposed of it. 21 7 According to the district court, Hines sought to impose liability on Osmose merely because Osmose
was part of a transaction involving a hazardous substance. 21 8 Reasoning that it
would circumvent congressional intent, the court rejected Hines' argument.21 0

According to the court, the purpose of section 9607(a)(3) was to impose liability only on those parties who had arranged for the disposal of a hazardous
22
substance rather than those who merely transferred hazardous substances. 1
Adopting Hines' argument would have shifted the emphasis from the "ar221
ranged for disposal" language to the "hazardous substance" language.
The court attempted to discern the meaning of "arranged for disposal.

222

The court found that prior case law consistently held that liability under sec-

tion 9607(a)(3) "arranged for disposal" language attaches only to those parties who were both motivated to dispose of hazardous waste, and transferred
the hazardous waste in order to treat or dispose of it. 223 The court found that
Osmose presented uncontradicted evidence that it sold the chemicals to Hines

solely for use in wood treatment and not for the disposal of its own wastes or
by-products.

224

The court found that Hines' allegations that Osmose had

215. Id. at 656.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 654. Osmose contended that a chemical sold for use in a manufacturing process
could not be considered a hazardous substance for purposes of establishing § 9607 liability. Id. at
656 n.4. The court rejected this contention, stating that "[the statutory definition of hazardous
substance is not so limited, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), and the courts have recognized that primary
products may be hazardous." Id. The court assumed, for the purposes of the summary judgment
motion, that the chemicals Osmose sold to Hines were hazardous substances. Id. at 656.
219. Id. at 654.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 654, 656.
223. Id. at 654-57. The court relied on three cases to support its ruling that a motivation to
dispose of waste was required before a defendant could arrange for disposal: United States v. A &
F Materials Co., Inc., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. I11.
1984) (holding that a defendant who had the
motivation to dispose could be liable under CERCLA); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F.
Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the defendant could be liable under the theory that it
was motivated to dispose of its waste, or under the theory that it knew, or had imputed knowledge,
of the intended use of the hazardous substance, and such use constituted disposal); and United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (holding
that a defendant who lacked motivation to dispose and who lacked control over the disposal process was not liable under CERCLA). Edward Hines Lumber Co., 685 F. Supp. at 654-55. For
further discussion of the facts of these cases, see supra notes 116-26, 139-55 and accompanying
text.
224. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656 (N.D. I11.),
affd in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
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knowledge of the manner in which the substance was disposed of was immaterial to the issue. 22 5' The court concluded that Osmose did not arrange for the
disposal of a hazardous substance because Osmose lacked motivation to dispose of the substance it sold, and the substance was not a waste. 226 The court,
therefore, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the
section 9607(a)(3) issue. 2 7

IV.

ANALYSIS

This section analyzes the district court's finding that Osmose did not arrange for disposal at the Hines facility in light of prior case law and the legislative history behind CERCLA. There are three arguments that support a result contrary to that reached by the court. First, the district court established
a standard for CERCLA liability that is unsupported by prior case law. Second, the court did not construe the facts in a manner most favorable to Hines,
as required when hearing a motion for summary judgement. Finally, the district court's holding frustrates the congressional purpose behind CERCLA.
This section examines each argument and contends that, under any one of
them, the district court should not have granted summary judgment because,
at the very least, Hines raised a factual question that should have reached the
jury.
A.

The District Court Established A New Standard For CERCLA
Liability

The district court established a new standard for the "arranged for disposal" language of section 9607(a)(3) that is unsupported by prior case law. The
district court ruled that Osmose, as a seller of hazardous substances, could be
liable for arranging for disposal only if the sale was motivated by a need to
dispose of hazardous waste. 228 The district court relied on three prior cases to
support its motivation requirement. 229 Those cases support the proposition that
the seller can be liable if the proper motivation exists. 23 0 They, however, do
not support the converse proposition that without the proper motivation, a
seller cannot be liable.
The courts, in two of the three cases relied upon by the district court,
United States v. A & F Materials Co.23 ' and New York v. General Electric
Co.,232 found the seller of hazardous substances could be held liable on the
225. Id.
226. Id. at 654-56.
227. Id. at 656.
228. Id. at 654-56.
229. Id.; see supra note 223.
230. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 695 F. Supp. 651, 656 (N.D. I11.),
atPd in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
231. 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
232. 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
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theory that the seller was motivated to dispose of hazardous waste.2 33 The
courts, therefore, concluded that those sellers could be found liable for arranging for disposal under section 9607(a)(3). 3 4 There is little question that a
seller who sells hazardous waste, with motivation to discard it, will be held
liable for arranging for disposal.23 Neither of those cases, however, holds that
such motivation is an absolute requirement for liability under section
9607(a)(3). In fact, the General Electric court specifically referred to other
theories, which do not require motivation, under which the seller could be lia-

ble.2 6 One such theory finds the seller could be liable if the seller knew, or
had imputed knowledge, that the hazardous waste would be used in a manner
constituting disposal.23 7
The district court also relied on United States v. Westinghouse Electric

Corp.'38 for the proposition that lack of motivation to dispose places a seller

outside the scope of section 9607(a)(3).13 9 The Westinghouse court, however,

found that the seller lacked more than just motivation; the seller also lacked
any control over the disposal decision.240 The purchaser generated the waste,
and the purchaser made the decision of the manner in which to dispose of that
waste.24' The presence of proper motivation might have been sufficient in itself
for the court to impose liability under section 9607(a)(3). 242 The court, how-

ever, certainly did not rule that other43factors, such as authority to control the

2
disposal process, were not sufficient.

These cases, at most, stand for the proposition that if the sale of a hazardous substance was motivated by the need to dispose of waste, the seller can be
liable for arranging for disposal under section 9607(a)(3). They do not, how-

ever, stand for the converse of that proposition: that a seller who lacks motivation cannot be liable.
233. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. at 845; General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 297.
234. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. at 845; General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 297.
235. See, e.g., A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. at 845; General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at
297; see also United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that a
seller indisputably "arranged for disposal" when it sold its hazardous waste as a means of disposing it).
236. See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
237. Id. For a further discussion of the General Elec. opinion, see supra notes 149-55 and
accompanying text.
238. 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
239. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 654-55 (N.D. 111.),
aff'd in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
240. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1233.
241. Id.; For a more detailed discussion of the Westinghouse opinion, see supra notes 116-26
and accompanying text. For further discussion of the authority to control theory, see supra notes
168-72 and accompanying text.
242. Had the seller been motivated to dispose of its hazardous substances, the Westinghouse
court could have found the sale to have been an arrangement for disposal. See supra notes 139-48
and accompanying text.
243. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230, 1233-34
(S.D. Ind. 1983).
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The District Court Did Not Construe Facts In A Manner Most
Favorable To The Nonmoving Party

The second reason to deny the motion for summary judgement is that the
court did not construe the facts in a manner most favorable to Hines. When a
court decides a summary judgment motion, it must construe the facts most
favorably to the nonmoving party. 244 Hines alleged that Osmose knew the facility was improperly designed, and the employees were improperly trained. 24 5
If the district court had followed other cases, such as Aceto241 or General
Electric,247 which denied defendant's motion to dismiss a claim of liability
under the "arranged for disposal" provision where a defendant had knowledge
of the disposal process, 248 Hines' allegations should have survived a summary
judgment motion. Hines' complaint raised a factual question as to Osmose's
knowledge of the disposal process. After all, Osmose designed and built the
system, and Osmose trained Hines' employees. If proven, these allegations
support the notion that Osmose knew how the hazardous substances would be
disposed of and that such disposal would cause environmental harm.
The knowledge theory can be taken one step further. In the Aceto case, the
court found that liability under the "arranged for disposal" provision may exist where the defendant had some authority to control the disposal process. 249
In that case, the defendant maintained ownership of the substance but transferred it to be "formulated." 2 5 Although Osmose did not have any ownership
rights in the substance it supplied to Hines, nor did it own the facility, it still
had some implicit control in the disposal process.251 Osmose's implicit control
244. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986) ("We are bound for the purposes of this
review to take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true."); Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 493 (1986) (same); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S.
117, 125-26 n.5 (1975) (same); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 293 n.3 (1984)
(same). The appellate court made the following assumptions when deciding Osmose's motion for
summary judgment: (1) that Osmose drafted the defective design; (2) that Osmose did not build
the plant to standard, (3) that Osmose failed to properly train Hines' employees, and (4) that
Osmose could have rectified the problem sooner and cheaper. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988).
The district court never revealed exactly what facts it was assuming for purposes of summary
judgment. Even if the district court assumed the facts most favorable to Hines, however, the court
still would not find that Osmose was motivated to dispose of a waste. Osmose's involvement with
the Hines facility might have amounted to either knowledge of the use for which the CCA had
been purchased or authority to control its disposal. Osmose was not, however, motivated to dispose
of waste under any set of conceivable facts. Osmose would not have been liable regardless of what
facts the court assumed because the district court's analysis required both motivation and waste.
245. For the assumptions used by the appellate court when it ruled on the motion for summary
judgment, see supra note 244.
246. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
247. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
248. See Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1381-82; General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at

297.
249. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1382.

250. Id. at 1375.
251. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir.
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is due to the fact that it built the facility and trained those who used it. If
Hines' allegations were correct, Osmose knew the facility was substandard,
and therefore, arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances through its
own negligent design and construction."
C.

The District Court's Holding Frustrates The Congressional Purpose
Behind CERCLA

The third argument to reverse the grant of summary judgment is that the
district court's holding frustrates the congressional purpose behind CERCLA.
Courts have consistently held that section 9607(a) of CERCLA should not be
interpreted in any manner that apparently frustrates the statute's goals without clear congressional intent to do so.2" 3 Congress intended to impose liability
on all responsible parties involved in handling hazardous substances. Congress
imposed this liability on all responsible parties in order to provide an incentive
to those parties to handle hazardous substances with the utmost care.2"" If
Osmose knew of the problems at Hines' facility, but hid that knowledge, while
continuing to profit by the sale of its hazardous substances, then Osmose is
exactly the type of party upon whom Congress intended to impose CERCLA
liability. By granting Osmose's motion for summary judgment, the district
court interpreted section 9607(a)(3) in a way that frustrates CERCLA's
objectives.
V.

IMPACT

The immediate effect of the district court's opinion in Edward Hines Lumber Co. is that it establishes a new standard for imposing liability under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA. This standard requires that the defendant possess a motivation to dispose of waste before it can be found to have "arranged
for disposal." Although other courts have had little difficulty deciding that
liability may exist when such motivation was present, 6 5 courts have also held
that parties may have "arranged for disposal" of a hazardous substance based
26
on other theories.
1988).
252. Cf. supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text.
253. E.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that in the absence of specific congressional intent to the contrary, § 9607(a)(3) should
not be interpreted in any way that frustrates the statute's goals); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding the court was obligated to
construe CERCLA provisions broadly to avoid frustrating the beneficial legislative purposes);

New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to interpret
CERCLA in any way that frustrates the statute's goals)).
254. For a further discussion of congressional intent, see supra notes 78-88 and accompanying
text.
255. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text.
256. For a discussion of courts that have held defendants may be liable for arranging for dispo-

sal because they had retained authority to control the disposal process, or because they had knowledge of the intended improper use of the hazardous substances, see supra notes 149-72.
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The district court's analysis creates large loopholes in CERCLA that Congress certainly did not intend. 5 7 For example, a manufacturer who feared that
hazardous substances used in its manufacturing process would be released
could contract with a third party to perform that manufacturing process and
transfer the finished product back to the manufacturer. 58 Because the manufacturer never intended to dispose of wastes, it would be absolved of liability
under the motivation standard. In addition, a manufacturer of a hazardous
substance, or a product containing hazardous substances, could sell its product
for a use that would constitute disposal and not be subjected to liability. For
example, a manufacturer could sell a useful product, which is not a waste, to a
dragstrip for use as a dust suppressant and not have to worry about liability as
2 59
long as it was not motivated to dispose of a waste.
Congress could not have intended such a result. The motivation standard
allows sellers of hazardous substances to profit from their transactions while
closing their eyes to the outcome of their activities. Those are exactly the per2 60
sons upon whom Congress intended to impose CERCLA liability.
In order to effectuate the congressional purpose, other courts have held that
a party may have "arranged for disposal" of a hazardous substance under
more flexible theories of liability than the motivation requirement. The knowledge theory has been used by numerous courts to deny motions to dismiss
claims of liability under section 9607(a)(3) where the seller knew that its hazardous substances would be improperly disposed. 6' This standard prevents the

257. For a discussion of the intended scope of CERCLA liability, see supra note 78-108 and
accompanying text.
258. This factual situation closely resembles the facts of United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F. Supp.
140 (W.D. Tenn. 1987). In those cases, pesticide manufacturers transferred hazardous chemicals
to third party formulators who were to mix the chemicals and return them to the manufacturers.
The mixing process necessarily leaked the chemicals into the environment. Each court held that
the manufacturer could not escape liability under section 9607(a)(3) simply by contracting their
responsibilities away to third parties, who coincidentally turned out to be judgment proof. See
supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
259. This hypothetical is a variation of the facts of New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F.
Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes 149-73 and accompanying text. In that case, the seller was motivated to dispose of a waste. The hypothetical
assumes that the seller was actually manufacturing the hazardous substance, rather than generating it as a waste and was selling the substance solely for a profit rather than to dispose of it.
Under the General Electric opinion, this seller could be liable because it had knowledge, or imputed knowledge, of the intended use of the product, and that use constituted disposal. See General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
260. For further discussion of congressional intent, see supra notes 78-88.
261. See, e.g., Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d at 1381-82 (finding defendant may be
liable where it retained control over the hazardous substances and knew that the substances it
transferred would be leaked and spilled in their normal usage); Velsicol Chem. Corp., 701 F.
Supp. at 142 (finding that defendant may have arranged for disposal when it had knowledge that
the hazardous substances it transferred would be improperly disposed during their intended use);
General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 297 (finding defendant may be liable when it had knowledge
that purchaser of its hazardous substances would use them by spraying them on the ground).
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seller of the hazardous substance from simply ignoring the results of its activities. Courts have refused, however, to extend the knowledge theory to include

the mere foreseeability of possible future disposal.262

Another theory that courts have used to deny motions to dismiss claims of

liability under section 9607(a)(3) is the control theory. The control theory imposes liability on those persons who have some authority to control the disposal
process.'" In United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemical Corp., the court

found that the defendant may have retained authority to control the third
party's use of the hazardous substances.264 The defendant could be liable for
arranging for disposal because the third party's use of the hazardous substances constituted disposal.266 Again, this theory imposes liability on a de-

fendant that is not motivated to dispose of its waste, yet that is clearly the
type of party upon whom Congress intended to impose liability.
One important aspect of the court opinions discussed in the Background
section is that the theories used to impose liability on the defendant are flexi-

ble and do not foreclose the use of alternative theories. For example, the court
in New York v. General Electric Co. held that the defendant may have been
liable under several theories of liability, including motivation and knowledge
theories.2 61 On the other hand, the Edward Hines Lumber Co. motivation

standard forecloses alternative theories of liability.2"7 Congress used broad language in CERCLA and intended that the statute be interpreted broadly in
order to achieve the congressional purpose.26 8 Congress never expressed an intent that motivation be a prerequisite to CERCLA liability. 269
262. E.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,998, 20,999 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (finding that the foreseeability of the sold product's eventual need to be disposed some forty years in the future was not sufficient to hold the seller liable
for the purchaser's eventual improper disposal); see also Jersey City Redev. Auth. v. PPG Indus.,
655 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1987). In Jersey City, the defendant manufacturer disposed of hazardous waste from its manufacturing process on its own property before it sold the property to a third
party. Id. at 1259. The third party transferred fill from the property to another party who deposited the fill on another piece of land. Id. The court denied the third party's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the "arranged for disposal" claim. Id. at 1261-62. The court, however,
found that the foreseeability of the removal of waste from the original property was insufficient to
find the original owner and manufacturer liable for arranging for disposal on another piece of
land. Id. at 1259-61. The court reached its decision reluctantly, recognizing that the defendant
would certainly have been liable for arranging for disposal on the original piece of property. Id. at
1260. That question, however, was not in issue.
263. For a discussion of courts holding that defendants who have retained authority to control
the disposal process may be liable under § 9607(a)(3), see supra notes 168-72 and accompanying
text.
264. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989).
265. For further discussion of Aceto Agric. Chemns. Corp., see supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
266. New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
267. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 656 (N.D. I1l.)
afid in part, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
268. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
269. A requirement of motivation is not consistent with congressional intent to hold all liable
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The standard set by the Hines district court forecloses the use of any alternative theory once the defendant is found to lack a motivation to dispose of
waste. That standard is too rigid to accomplish the congressional purpose behind CERCLA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The district court opinion in Edward Hines Lumber Co. established a precedent which requires that a defendant be motivated to dispose of waste before it
can be liable for arranging for disposal under section 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA.
Such a prerequisite creates a loophole under CERCLA that will allow persons
who were in control of hazardous substances, and who, arguably, were responsible for their release into the environment, to escape CERCLA liability simply because they were not specifically motivated to dispose of the substance
that was released.
By taking such a restricted view of section 9607(a)(3), the court's opinion
frustrates Congress' purpose behind CERCLA, namely, to create a compelling
incentive to handle hazardous substances with the utmost care. Although Osmose might not have exercised much care when it supplied the hazardous substances to Hines, this court allowed Osmose to escape liability when it granted
their motion for summary judgment.
James P. Teufel

who transact in hazardous substances in order to assure proper handling. See supra notes 78-88
and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent).

